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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Governor of the State of Utah issued a policy
prohibiting employees in the Division of Wildlife Resources
(DWR), from participating in annual computer drawings for
once-in-a-lifetime hunting permits.

The appellants,

representing employees in DWR, brought an action in Third
District Court seeking injunctive relief against the policy
and declaratory judgement relief declaring the policy unconstitutional.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court granted a motion for summary
judgement to the respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek a decision of this court reversing
the summary judgement entered by the lower court and an
Order declaring the policy issued by the respondents unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the resoondents
from enforcing the same.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Each year the Division of Wildlife Resources of the
State of Utah conducts a special computer drawing for oncein-a- lifetime hunting permits.

The drawing covers the

Buffalo hunt for which 20 resident permits are awarded;
the Big Horn Sheep hunt for which 20 resident permits
are awarded; and the Moose hunt for which 90 resident
permits are awarded.

Residents of the State of Utah may

submit applications and if successful in the drawing,
receive a hunting permit.

The permit may only be obtained

once in a lifetime, whether the hunter is successful in
harvesting the animal or not.

Thus the name "once-in-a-

lifetime" hunting permit.

-2-
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On November 7, 1978, the governor issued a policy
statement prohibiting personnel from the DWR, members of
the Board of Big Game Control and the Director of the
Department of Natural Resources from submitting applications
for the annual drawings.

His stated reason for issuing the

policy was to "clear up any misunderstanding that may arise
about the propriety of Wildlife personnel participating in
a drawing of this kind."
Though the policy statement did not say so, apparently
the governor believed that a disproportionately high number
of DWR personnel had been successful in obtaining hunting
permits in the draw.

However, notwithstanding the governor's

belief, the facts show that only one DWR employee received
a permit in 1977, and three DWR employees received permits
in 1978 (Affidavit No. 5).

Furthermore, the governor's

policy statement and the pleadings filed herein specifically
admit that absolutely no evidence of impropriety or wrongdoing exists on the part of DWR personnel or anyone else
connected with the drawings.
Finally, affidavits on file herein show that Utah is
the only state among the Rocky Mountain States which has
a policy prohibiting its public employees from participating
in the drawings (Affidavit tlo. 6), and at least three less
burdensome alternative approaches are available which would
- 3-
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allow the state to accomplish the purpose of the policy.
These alternative approaches are:

(1) to contract out the

drawing to an independent third party computer firm
(Affidavits No.

1 and 2);

(2) to partially contract out

the drawing by having it conducted and overseen by an
independent third party (Affidavit No.

3); and

(3) to

limit the restriction against participating in the drawing
to only the six DWR employees who are actually involved in
conducting the drawing instead of all 350 DWR employees
(Affidavit No.

4).
POINT I

THE POLICY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
BECAUSE THERE ARE SEVERAL LESS BURDENSOME ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH
THE SAi'1E PURPOSE.
The appellants submit that the policy promulgated
by the governor violates equal protection because there
are several less burdensome alternatives available to
accomplish the same purpose.
A three-step test for determining the validity of
a law or policy restricting fundamental constitutional
rights was enunciated by the California Supreme Court
in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District, 421
P.2d 409 (1966), a case which held unconstitutional a
statute prohibiting public employees from taking an active
part in any political campaign.

The court said at page 411

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"A governmental agency which would
require a waiver of constitutional rights
as a condition of public employment bears
the burden of showing the practical necessity
for the limitation, and that it must demonstrate, (1) that the political restraints
rationally relate to the enhancement of
public service, (2) that the benefits which
the public gains by the restraints outweigh
the resulting impairment of constitutional
rights, and (3) that no alternatives less
subversive of constitutional rights are
available.
(emphasis added).
A subsequent California case, City of Carmel-ByThe-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225 (1970), held unconstitutional
a statute requiring financial disclosure by public officials
on the grounds that less burdensome alternatives existed to
accomplish the purpose of the statute.

The court said at

page 228:
"The familiar rule is that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." (NAACP v. Alabama (1964) 377
U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 1314, 12
L.Ed. 2d 325; Griswold v. State of Connecticut
(1965) 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S.Ct. 1678,
1682, 14 L.Ed.2d 510.) "[Elven though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved." (Shelton v.
Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct.
247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231.) "Precision of.
regulation is required so that the exercise
of our most precious freedoms will not be
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unduly curtailed except to the extent
necessitated by the legitimate governmental objective.
[Citations. J"
(Vogel
v. County of Los Angelos (1967) 68 Cal.2d
18, 22, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409, 411, 434,
P.2d 961, 963.)
The court in City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, supra, stated
further at page 232:
"[W]here fundamental personal liberties
are involved, they may not be abridged by
the States simply on a showing that a
regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper
state purpose.
'Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty,
the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling.'
[Citation.] The law must be shown 'necessary, and not merely rationally related to,
the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy.'
[Citations. J"
(Griswold v. State
of Connecticut, 6u.ptta., 381 U.S. 479, 497,
85 S. Ct. 16 78, 1689).
"The breadth of
legislative abridgement must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose."
(Sheldon
v. Tucker, 6u.p'tt1, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81
S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231.)
Fort v. Civil Service Commission,

392 P.2d 385 (1964),

involved a civil service employee who was dismissed for
violating a county charter provision restricting the political
activity of county employees.

In holding the charter pro-

vision unconstitutional for being overly broad, the court
said the following at page 389:

-6-
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"It would plainly be incumbent upon
the state to demonstrate that no alternative
forms of regulation would combat the asserted
abuses without infringing on First Amendment
rights."
Another case supportive of the proposition that a
policy restricting fundamental rights cannot stand if there
is a less restrictive alternative available to accomplish the
same policy, is ::fancuso v. Taft, 341 F.Supp. 574 (1972).
There the court said in declaring unconstitutional a city
charter provision restricting political activity rights:
"A regulation is invalid when there
are less drastic means by which a statute
restricting First Amendment rights could
achieve its legitimate goal."
In the instant case, there are affidavits on file which
show the existence of at least three approaches which are
less burdensome on the fundamental right of the DWR employees
to participate in the drawing and to hunt, while still
allowing the accomplishITJ.ent of the purpose for which the
policy 1-1as implemented.
The first alternative, as set forth in affidavits
no. 1 and 2, involves contracting out the entire drawing
process to an independent third party.

This would totally

remove all DWR employees from the drawing process.
The second alternative, as set forth in affidavit
no

3. involves partiallv contracting out the drawing

;:n:-ocess to an independent third part:r with the computer
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service and non-consequential support services being provided
by DWR personnel as necessary.

This independent third party

could be an elected official, any civic minded individual
selected by the governor, or indeed the governor himself.
This approach would result in no expenditure of funds by the
state.
The third alternative, as set forth in affidavit no. 4,
involves limiting the prohibition to only those few DWR
employees who are actually involved in the drawing process.
Currently, the process is completely handled by eight DWR
employees, and could conceivable be handled by six employees.
Therefore, it makes little sense to prohibit all 350 DWR
employees from participating in the drawing, when the
prohibition could be limited to those employees actually
involved in conducting the drawing.

This third alternative

is not totally acceptable to the appellants for obvious
reasons, but is suggested simply because they find it less
repugnant than a total prohibition.

The six employees would

have to be volunteers who simply elect not to hunt.
In the instant case it is clear that the right to
participate in the annual computer drawing for once-in-alifetime hunting permits, and to engage in the hunt itself
should they be successful in the drawing, is a fundamental
right to DWR personnel.

To say that hunting is a major
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part of a DWR employee's life is a great understatement.
Indeed, it is because of their love for hunting and outdoor recreation that most personnel in the DWR are employed
in that agency.

DWR personnel are the core of the hunting

fraternity in the State of Utah, and to arbitrarily restrict
their participation in that hunting fraternity is to deny
them their First Amendment Right of Freedom of Association.
To arbitrarily restrict their right to hunt and thereby
restrict their right to harvest game to sustain themselves
and their families, is to deprive them of property without
Due Process of law.

There is no justifiable reason to deny

DWR employees, who are taxpayers of the state, access to
the same program which is available to all other residents
of the state.

To do so is to violate the Equal Protection

rights of the DI.JR employees.
This arbitrary prohibition is particularly repugnant
in view of the fact that it is totally unnecessary.

As

set forth above, there are at least three alternatives
available to the governor which would accomplish the same
purpose without violating the rights of DWR employees.
These alternative approaches should be utilized before
infringing upon the above-mentioned fundamental rights of
DI.JR personnel.

-9-
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
IN VIEW OF THE COURT'S ADMISSION THAT MATERIAL
FACTS WERE IN DISPUTE.
The law is clear that summary judgement cannot be
granted when material facts are in dispute.

Rule 56(c),

U.R.C.P. states:
"Motion and Proceedings thereon.
The
motion shall be served at least 10 davs before
the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing mav serve
opposing affidavits.
The judgement sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the oleadin s, de ositions,
answers to interrogatories, an admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no enuine issue as to an material
act and that the movin
artv is entitled to a
judgement as a matter o law.
A summary judgement,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages."
(emphasis added).
Following that rule, the Utah Supreme Court in Hatch v.
Sugarhouse Finance Company, 434 P.2d 758 (1967), and Burnham
v. Bankers Life

& Casualtv Company, 470 P.2d 261 (1970) held

sunnnary judgements granted by lower courts inappropriate because material issues of fact remained in dispute.
In the instant case, the lower court issued a memorandum
decision granting the respondent's motion for summary judgement
In that memorandum decision, the lower court stated
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Based on the assertions of counsel that
there are no questions of fact but only
questions of law, the court finds that the
policy statement issued by the Governor was
within the constitutional powers of the office
and gives summary judgement to the Defendant.
However, the court wishes to note that the
Plaintiff has alleged that the Governor's
policy is too stringent and that the same
thing can be accomplished in a "less burdensome and restrictive" way, and this may
be so.
Affadavits are provided that assert
alternative methods of solving this problem
but in the court's opinion they raise
uestions of fact which the court cannot consi er on a motion or summary judgement.
The court feels that the only wav to
resolve the uestion on whether there is a
ess ur ensome an restrictive wa is at an
evi entiary hearing.
In short, the lower court granted the respondent's
motion for summary judgement notwithstanding the admission
that there existed disputed issues of material fact.

For

that reason the lower court's decision was in error.
However, the appellants are not interested in "winning
the battle only to lose the war."

Therefore, unless this

court agrees with the argument of the appellants in POINT I,
the appellants are not interested in having the case remanded
back to the lower court for the evidentiary hearing referred
to in the 101-1er court's memorandum decision.

-11-
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CONCLUSION
The policy promulgated by the governor violates equal
protection because there are several less burdensome
al~ernatives

available to accomplish the same purpose.

These alternative approaches should be utilized before
unnecessarily infringing upon the fundamental rights of
DWR personnel.
DATED this 10th day of October, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two (2) copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant upon Michael L. Deamer, Deputy
Attorney General, attorney for defendants-respondents, 236
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, by hand
delivering two (2) copies to his office this 17th
of October, 1979.
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